The Classified Information Procedures Act in the Age of Terrorism: Remodeling CIPA in an Offense-Specific Manner by Chandran, Arjun
CHANDRAN IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2015 11:28 AM 
 
Notes 
THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 
PROCEDURES ACT IN THE AGE OF 
TERRORISM: REMODELING CIPA IN AN 
OFFENSE-SPECIFIC MANNER 
ARJUN CHANDRAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) sets the 
balancing point between the government’s interest in preventing 
disclosure of classified information with a criminal defendant’s right 
to exculpatory material. Although CIPA was originally drafted with 
espionage cases in mind, the statute has become more commonly 
associated with terrorism prosecutions. This contextual shift has 
disrupted CIPA’s interest-balancing formulation by altering the 
governmental interests at stake. CIPA’s discovery burdens on the 
defendant are ordinarily constitutionally justified by the strong 
countervailing state interest in preserving vital national-security 
information. This concern is less salient with terrorism defendants, 
who are unlikely to possess state secrets. Accordingly, those 
defendants may require further reciprocity in discovery procedures to 
keep the statute within constitutional parameters. This Note examines 
the ill effects of CIPA’s contextual shift and proposes a set of 
amendments to alleviate those concerns. Chiefly, this Note suggests an 
offense-specific CIPA, whereby the procedural mechanisms of the 
statute are tailored to the offense charged. The three core 
recommendations of this Note are (1) inclusion of defense counsel in 
the discovery process and clearer standards to govern discoverability; 
(2) a limited and qualified declassification requirement in select 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act cases; and (3) bifurcation of 
admissibility hearings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The use of classified information in judicial proceedings requires 
striking a balance between the government’s interest in preserving its 
state secrets and the criminal defendant’s right to obtain information 
necessary to his defense. Over the last three decades, that balancing 
point has been set by the Classified Information Procedures Act 
(CIPA).1 Despite a sharp contextual shift in the statute’s use from 
espionage cases in the Cold War era to terrorism cases post-9/11,2 
CIPA has remained the standard for governing the introduction of 
classified information in criminal trials. 
This Note examines whether an unamended CIPA is still an 
appropriate tool in light of this contextual shift, one marked by a 
climate of government secrecy altogether unfathomable by the 
framers of the statute in 1980. Though scholars have exhaustively 
detailed the statute’s facial defects,3 the constitutional ramifications of 
the contextual shift to terrorism cases have been decidedly 
understudied. Existing scholarship has documented a transition from 
cases in which a government or military-insider defendant already 
possesses classified information, to cases in which an outsider 
defendant comes into possession of classified information only 
through the government’s productions during discovery.4 
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of literature on how the ill effects of 
this insider-to-outsider transition should be remedied. 
CIPA currently calibrates the balancing point between the 
competing interests of the state and the defendant by requiring 
pretrial disclosures of the classified evidence the defense anticipates 
 
 1. Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. III §§ 1–16 (2012). 
 2. See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 84–86 (2008), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Alumni_Affairs/USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (documenting 
the shift toward CIPA’s use in terrorism prosecutions). 
 3. See generally Joshua L. Dratel, Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act: 
The Growing Threat to the Adversary Process, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1041, 1041–42 (2007) 
(explaining that CIPA’s allowance of ex parte submissions threatens the integrity of the 
adversarial process); Afsheen John Radsan, Remodeling the Classified Information Procedures 
Act (CIPA), 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 439 (2010) (asserting that CIPA’s secretive procedures 
clash with norms of transparency in the American justice system); Melanie Reid, Secrets Behind 
Secrets: Disclosure of Classified Information Before and During Trial and Why CIPA Should Be 
Revamped, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 272, 274 (2011) (noting that CIPA has been not only 
misunderstood but also misapplied by federal courts). 
 4. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and 
FISA in the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2005). For a discussion of the insider–
outsider distinction, see infra Part III.B.  
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using and judicial determinations on the use, relevance, and 
admissibility of such evidence. Importantly, its disclosure 
requirements operate to prevent an artful defendant from threatening 
to reveal sensitive classified information as leverage to induce the 
government to drop criminal charges against him. The strong state 
interests in preserving secrets vital to national security can justify 
burdens on defendants that would otherwise be impermissibly 
nonreciprocal.5 But in “outsider” cases—those in which the defendant 
does not possess classified information—these state interests rapidly 
dissipate. Accordingly, the defendant is left with onerous, 
nonreciprocal discovery burdens without any countervailing state 
interest to justify them. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief history 
of how courts dealt with classified information before CIPA and 
identifies the catalysts for its passage. Part II details the relevant 
provisions of the statute and describes early case law, which continues 
to inform how courts interpret CIPA. Part III documents the 
proliferation of terrorism prosecutions and document classification 
post-9/11 and discusses the under-appreciated constitutional concerns 
posed by the statute in the twenty-first century. Finally, Part IV 
proposes a refashioning of CIPA’s core procedures in an offense-
specific fashion. If the outsider nature of terrorism defendants 
reduces governmental interests vis-à-vis espionage prosecutions, then 
CIPA should be revised to reformulate the procedural rights of the 
Executive and the criminal defendant to account for these different 
settings. 
Though the primary purpose of this Note is to propose offense-
based tailoring of CIPA provisions, it also attempts to set a starting 
point for future scholarship by drafting sample amendments that 
would alleviate CIPA’s constitutional defects in outsider cases, while 
preserving the statute’s vital functions. The first proposal involves 
inclusion of defense counsel in the discovery process and suggests 
clearer standards to govern discoverability. The second is a limited 
and qualified declassification requirement in select cases involving the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The final 
recommendation is the bifurcation of admissibility hearings to 
prevent CIPA from being used as an offensive weapon. 
 
 5. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 902 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Discovery 
proceedings under CIPA . . . may justify an exchange of information between the prosecution 
and defense that is not entirely reciprocal.”). 
CHANDRAN IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2015  11:28 AM 
1414 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1411 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY: CIPA’S PROLOGUE AND INFANCY 
A. The History of Classified Information Use in Criminal Trials 
The notion that the Executive may withhold sensitive 
information concerning national security in a judicial proceeding long 
predates the passage of CIPA.6 In the seminal 1957 case of Roviaro v. 
United States,7 the Supreme Court established a test whereby the 
Executive’s interest in withholding national-security information 
would be balanced against the defendant’s right to a fair trial.8 
Specifically, “where the disclosure of [classified evidence] . . . is 
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a 
fair determination of a cause, the [executive] privilege must give 
way.”9 The Court nonetheless declined to establish a “fixed rule with 
respect to disclosure,”10 holding that “[w]hether a proper balance 
renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular 
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime 
charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the 
informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.”11 Apart from these 
vague instructions, the Court gave little guidance to lower courts on 
how to balance the competing interests.12 The unambiguous takeaway 
from Roviaro, however, was that the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
cannot be overridden by executive privilege.13 
 
 6. See Sandra D. Jordan, Classified Information and Conflicts in Independent Counsel 
Prosecutions: Balancing the Scales of Justice After Iran-Contra, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1651, 1657–
58 (1991) (“The presidential power to classify information in the interests of national 
security . . . has been exercised as a matter of course during the country’s history, without much 
notice from the legislative or judicial branches.”).  
 7. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
 8. Id. at 60–61. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 62. 
 11. Id.  
 12. In United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985), the Fourth Circuit read Roviaro 
as calling “for balancing the public interest in protecting the information against the individual’s 
right to prepare his defense,” and observed that “[i]ts application results in a more strict rule of 
admissibility.” Id. at 1105. 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he 
government’s interest . . . cannot override the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”); United States v. 
Pitt, 382 F.2d 322, 325 (4th Cir. 1967) (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 628) (noting that executive 
privilege is “limited by the ‘fundamental requirements of fairness’”).  
CHANDRAN IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2015  11:28 AM 
2015] CIPA IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 1415 
B. The Growing Threat of Graymail and the Impetus for CIPA 
Whereas Roviaro regulated when the Executive could withhold 
classified information from the defendant, the government had no 
recourse if the defendant himself chose to disclose sensitive 
information from his own knowledge as a stratagem to secure his 
freedom. This problem, known as “graymail,” occurs when a potential 
criminal defendant threatens to expose sensitive classified 
information if he is prosecuted. This creates a “disclose or dismiss” 
dilemma,14 whereby “[t]he Government . . . must choose between 
going forward with the prosecution, thereby compromising the 
classified material, or safeguarding the material but dropping the 
prosecution.”15 Graymail thus creates an irreconcilable conflict 
between the government’s dual obligations to safeguard national-
security secrets and prosecute violators of federal law.16 Concerned 
with this phenomenon, Congress passed CIPA in 1980.17 
Unsurprisingly, CIPA’s most prominent cases in the first twenty 
years after its passage involved espionage.18 Even after the Cold War 
ended, CIPA was most famously used in the prosecutions of spies like 
Brian Regan, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen.19 Indeed, this was 
envisioned as the primary use of CIPA at the time of its passage. 
 
 14. S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4297. 
 15. Graymail Legis.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. Permanent Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of 
Rep. Morgan Murphy, Chairman of the Subcommittee). 
 16. Graymail: S. 1482: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
13 (1980) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Criminal Justice Division). 
 17. See Timothy J. Shea, CIPA Under Siege: The Use and Abuse of Classified Information 
in Criminal Trials, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 657, 661 (1990). See generally House Hearings, supra 
note 15 (noting concerns about graymail when discussing the proposed legislation); Senate 
Hearings, supra note 16 (discussing the problems of graymail that prompted the proposed 
legislation). Chiefly, Congress wished to ensure “that classified information which bears no 
possible relationship to the issues in a criminal trial is not disclosed” and that relevant classified 
information is identified before trial “so that the Government can make an informed decision in 
determining whether or not the benefits of prosecution will outweigh the harm stemming from 
public disclosure of such information.” 126 CONG. REC. 26,503 (1980) (statement of Rep. 
Romano Mazzoli, floor manager of the bill for the House). 
 18. For examples, see generally United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Walker, 796 F.2d 43 (4th 
Cir. 1986); United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lee, 90 F. 
Supp. 2d 1324 (D.N.M. 2000); United States v. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Va. 1997); 
United States v. Ntube, No. 93-0322-2(HHG), 1996 WL 808068 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 1996); United 
States v. Lonetree, 31 M.J. 849 (N-M.C.M.R. 1990).  
 19. Yaroshefsky, supra note 4, at 1068 n.22. 
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Congress was aware that one of the biggest problems with graymail 
was that it afforded spies de facto immunity from prosecution, 
because they tended to possess “military or technological secrets” 
that could be leveraged.20 Fearful that the public would feel that 
“there [was] no effective check against improper conduct by members 
of our intelligence agencies,”21 Congress passed CIPA to “help ensure 
that the intelligence agencies are subject to the rule of law.”22 
Although CIPA is a criminal-procedure statute that does not purport 
to alter the scheme of substantive rights afforded to criminal 
defendants,23 its procedural mechanisms were formulated with 
espionage and the threat of graymail in mind. When prosecutors use 
CIPA in terrorism cases, outside its drafting context, the 
governmental interests against disclosure are altered,24 and may or 
may not justify the level of deference to executive privilege warranted 
in espionage cases. 
The significance of this evolution can be seen by contrasting 
cases that exemplify the two different eras. In 1983, CIPA was used in 
the trial of Air Force General Richard Collins to prevent him from 
revealing “activities of the U.S. government with respect to joint 
Intelligence/Military operations and the utilization of secret overseas 
bank accounts to finance said operations.”25 In 2004, the same statute 
was used to withhold thousands of “non-pertinent” personal 
telephone conversations from the defendant, Sami Omar Al-
Hussayen, a doctoral student at the University of Idaho26 who was the 
target of extensive electronic surveillance conducted and authorized 
pursuant to FISA.27 This Note is principally concerned with 
identifying the changes in the governmental interests accompanying 
 
 20. House Hearings, supra note 15, at 5 (statement of Rep. Morgan Murphy, Chairman of 
the Subcommittee). 
 21. Id. 
 22. S. REP. NO. 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4296 
[hereinafter Senate Report]. 
 23. 126 CONG. REC. 26,504 (1980) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards) (stating that CIPA is 
“a lawyer-like response to a series of delicate legal problems. It is primarily a procedural bill. It 
does not attempt to alter substantive rights”).  
 24. This difference is chiefly a result of the insider–outsider distinction. See infra Part III.B. 
 25. United States v. Collins, 20 F.2d 1195, 1197–98 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 26. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Declare CIPA Unconstitutional as Applied in 
this Case at 3–4, United States v. Al-Hussayen, No. CR03-048-C-EJL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
29793 (D. Idaho Aug. 8, 2004).  
 27. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 
FISA at 2, Al-Hussayen, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29793. For further discussion of CIPA’s interplay 
with FISA, see infra Part II.C.  
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the shift from insider to outsider CIPA cases and reworking the 
interest-balancing formulation accordingly. 
II.  THE MECHANICS OF CIPA 
A. Statutory Overview 
CIPA “establishes procedures to protect classified information 
from public disclosure” in the course of a criminal action.28 “Its 
animating purpose is ‘to harmonize a criminal defendant’s right to 
obtain and present exculpatory material’”29 with the government’s 
countervailing interest in “‘withhold[ing] information from discovery 
when disclosure would be inimical to national security.’”30 In order to 
protect against harmful disclosures, CIPA allows pretrial 
determinations on the “use, relevance, or admissibility”31 of classified 
information that the defense “reasonably expects to disclose or cause 
the disclosure of”32 at trial. 
Despite the presence of classified information, CIPA does not 
change the government’s discovery obligations under Rule 16 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.33 If evidence meets the 
materiality standard of Rule 16(a)(1) and is otherwise discoverable, 
then “the government’s privilege must give way . . . to [the] criminal 
defendant’s right to present a meaningful defense.”34 That is to say, 
“If the evidence is discoverable but the information is privileged, the 
court must . . . decide whether the information is helpful or material 
to the defense.”35 Still, upon a sufficient showing, the court may 
 
 28. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 245–46 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 29. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 115–16 (2d Cir. 
2008) (quoting United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996)).  
 30. Id. at 116 (quoting United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 31. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(a) (2012). 
 32. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 5(a) (2012). 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis (Yunis II), 867 F.2d 617, 621–22 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“This 
Section creates no new rights of or limits on discovery . . . . Rather it contemplates an 
application of the general law of discovery in criminal cases to the classified information area 
with limitations imposed based on the sensitive nature of the classified information.”); see 
generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (governing discovery and disclosure obligations in federal criminal 
proceedings). 
 34. In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 124 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 35. Id. A “district court must first decide” whether the evidence is ordinarily discoverable 
under the general law of discovery. Id. (quoting Aref, 553 F.3d at 78). “If so, the second step is 
. . . deciding whether the government has made a facially valid claim of privilege and whether 
the evidence in question should nevertheless be disclosed as material to the defense.” United 
States v. Rezaq, 156 F.R.D. 514, 516 n.3 (D.D.C. 1994) (citing Yunis II, 867 F.2d at 623; United 
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authorize the government to substitute specified articles of classified 
information with a summary of the information contained therein, or 
a statement admitting relevant facts.36 This type of request may be 
made ex parte.37 Courts have typically afforded the government a 
great deal of deference with these requests.38  
Before providing the defendant with all discoverable materials, 
the government may move for a protective order pursuant to Section 
3 of CIPA to ensure that classified information furnished by the 
United States will not be disclosed.39 These protective orders usually 
require defense counsel to obtain security clearance at the 
appropriate level of classification, sign a memorandum of 
understanding, agree to review or discuss classified evidence only in a 
secure area of review (known as a Secure Compartmented 
Information Facility, or “SCIF”),40 and refrain from discussing the 
classified information with anyone not included in the order, 
including the defendant himself.41 
If the defendant anticipates disclosing classified information at 
pretrial or trial proceedings, then he is governed by Sections 5 and 6 
 
States v. Yunis (Yunis III), 924 F.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1991)), vacated on other grounds, 899 
F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 36. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 4 (2012). 
 37. Id.  
 38. See Saul M. Pilchen & Benjamin B. Klubes, Using the Classified Information 
Procedures Act in Criminal Cases: A Primer for Defense Counsel, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 
198 (1994) (“A stark example of leeway granted to the government . . . can be found in United 
States v. Yunis . . . [where] the court held . . . that the defendant was not entitled to his own tape-
recorded statements because they were not ‘helpful to the defense of [the] accused.’”) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Yunis II, 867 F.2d at 623). This came despite the court recognizing that 
generally the production of a defendant’s own statements is “‘practically a matter of right even 
without a showing of materiality.’” Yunis II, 867 F.2d at 621–22 (quoting United States v. 
Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 74 n.80 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 3 (2012). 
 40. A SCIF is an enclosure restricted to noncleared personnel, where Sensitive 
Compartmented Information (SCI) is viewed. “Designed to withstand eavesdropping, phone 
tapping and computer hacking,” SCIFs “are protected areas where classified conversations can 
be held.” Rajini Vaidyanathan, Barack Obama’s Top Secret Tent, BBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2011, 
11:44 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12810675. SCIFs must be totally 
soundproof and contain an Intrusion Detection System; entry usually requires “a combination 
of pin numbers, access badges and biometric data.” Id.  
 41. See, e.g., Protective Order, United States v. Khan, No. 11-20331-CR-JORDAN(s), 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188320, at *14–*15 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2012) (forbidding the defendant from 
disclosing classified information). The government tends to suggest the same form language in 
most of its motions seeking protective orders pursuant to Section 3. Cf. Protective Order (DE 
17), United States v. Foggo, No. 3:07-cr-00329-LAB (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2007), available at 
https://ecf.casd.uscourts.gov. 
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of CIPA. Section 5 obligates the defendant to notify the United States 
and the court of any classified information that he “reasonably 
expects to disclose or to cause the disclosure of” at trial.42 This 
requirement extends not only to any documents expected to be 
entered into evidence, or to testimony proffered by the defendant, 
but also to any information that defense counsel might seek to elicit 
from witnesses during direct or cross-examination.43 Failure to 
disclose such information may result in exclusion of that information 
at trial.44 Moreover, the Section 5 notice must specifically set out the 
classified information the defendant will rely on; “[a] general 
statement of the areas the evidence will cover is insufficient.”45 
Upon receiving the defendant’s Section 5 notice, the United 
States may request a hearing for a determination on the “use, 
relevance, or admissibility” of the classified information listed in the 
defendant’s notice, pursuant to Section 6.46 Such a hearing is held in 
camera at the request of the Attorney General.47 CIPA “does not 
alter the existing standards for determining relevance or 
admissibility.”48 Thus, courts do not consider whether information is 
classified when making the admissibility determination; classified 
information should still be admitted if it is otherwise allowed by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.49 The government may again move to 
 
 42. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 5(a).  
 43. See Jordan, supra note 6, at 1659 (“Section 5(a) is broad . . . ; it includes information 
that would be revealed in open court, such as testimony from witnesses or arguments of 
counsel.”). 
 44. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 5(b).  
 45. United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985). Similarly, the Eleventh 
Circuit has stated that it will “not countenance a Section 5(a) notice which allows a defendant to 
cloak his intentions and leave the government subject to surprise at what may be revealed in the 
defense.” United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199–1200 (11th Cir. 1983). CIPA instead 
“requires that the defendant state, with particularity, which items of classified information . . . 
will be revealed . . . . Id. at 1199. 
 46. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(a). If the government wishes to eliminate certain pieces of 
classified information pursuant to Section 6, it must provide the defendant with notice as to 
which specific parts of the Section 5(a) disclosure are at issue. Collins, 720 F.2d at 1200.  
 47. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(a). 
 48. 126 CONG. REC. 26,428 (1980). As discussed above, in practice, courts do sometimes 
impose a heightened standard of materiality in CIPA cases, though without explicit statutory 
justification. See supra note 38; see also United States v. Yunis (Yunis II), 867 F.2d 617, 623 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that discovery of classified information requires a further showing that 
the information will be “helpful” to the defense).  
 49. United States v. Wilson, 586 F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 750 F.2d 7 (2d 
Cir. 1984); see also Collins, 720 F.2d at 1199 (“[CIPA] does not suggest that simply because 
defense evidence may consist of classified information it shall be, ipso facto, excluded. Indeed, 
CHANDRAN IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2015  11:28 AM 
1420 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1411 
substitute that evidence with a summary or an admission of facts.50 
The court may allow this substitution if it would be “consistent with 
preserving the accused’s right to make a full defense,” or, “if no 
alternative suffices, . . . dismiss the indictment or take other 
measures.”51 As to any classified information that the court deems 
admissible at trial, the court must order the United States to provide 
the defendant with the evidence the government intends to use to 
rebut his classified information, “unless the interests of fairness do 
not so require.”52 
B. Judicial Review of CIPA 
The constitutionality of CIPA “has been tested repeatedly and 
uniformly upheld.”53 In fact, no court has ever invalidated any portion 
of the statute.54 Even so, CIPA continues to attract considerable 
constitutional scrutiny, as the challenges mounted by defendants have 
not subsided. Several of the earliest challenges to CIPA have set the 
tone for how courts interpret the statute today, even though the early 
courts viewed CIPA through an “insider” lens. This Section examines 
two Cold War–era opinions that fashioned much of the oft-cited 
language upholding the constitutionality of CIPA. It then 
demonstrates how applying those principles to outsider cases has 
created incongruous results. 
1. The Early Cases.  The highest-profile CIPA cases before the 
September 11 terrorist attacks were the trials of National Security 
Advisor John Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North for 
 
CIPA appears premised upon the assumption that, if material to the defense and not otherwise 
avoidable, such information shall be admissible.”).  
 50. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(a); see also Pilchen & Klubes, supra note 38, at 206–07 (“If the 
court accepts the substitution, summary or admission, it in effect alters the documents . . . to 
follow a script authored by the prosecutor. For defense counsel and the accused, the 
prosecution’s redrafting of their evidence may be the most unusual and disturbing aspect of the 
process authorized by CIPA.”). 
 51. Wilson, 586 F. Supp. at 1013; see also 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(c), (d) (providing for an 
alternative means of disclosure and the sealing of in camera hearings records).  
 52. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(f). “If the government does not comply with its obligations under 
section 6(f), the court may prohibit both its use of unrevealed classified information and its 
examination of witnesses with respect to that information.” United States v. North, 910 F.2d 
843, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 53. United States v. Hashmi, 621 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 54. United States v. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d 909, 913 n.1 (D. Md. 2011).  
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their roles in the Iran-Contra Affair.55 Both individuals challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute.56 North argued that CIPA’s Section 5 
notice requirements created unconstitutionally nonreciprocal 
discovery obligations by compelling him to furnish any classified 
testimony he anticipated eliciting from defense witnesses to the 
independent counsel without any reciprocal requirement as to the 
anticipated testimony of the independent counsel’s witnesses.57 
To support his constitutional challenge, North, like many CIPA 
defendants after him, relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s standard 
for discovery reciprocity set forth in Wardius v. Oregon.58 In that case, 
the Court struck down an Oregon criminal-procedure statute 
requiring disclosure of alibi defenses with no reciprocal obligation on 
the state.59 The Court declared itself “particularly suspicious” of 
nonreciprocal trial rules that interfere with a defendant’s right to a 
fair trial.60 It noted that “the State’s inherent information-gathering 
advantages suggest that if there is to be any imbalance in discovery 
rights, it should work in the defendant’s favor.”61 The North court 
found the defendant’s invocation of Wardius to be misplaced, because 
CIPA cases involve a strong governmental interest that may justify a 
nonreciprocal exchange of information between the prosecution and 
defense.62 The court suggested that unlike Wardius, where no 
 
 55. North was indicted on twelve counts relating to selling arms to Iran and providing 
assistance to the Contras, and was ultimately convicted on only three counts: aiding and abetting 
an endeavor to obstruct Congress in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505; destroying, altering, or 
removing official National Security Council documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2071; and 
accepting an illegal gratuity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B). North, 910 F.2d at 851–52. 
Poindexter was charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to make false statements 
and destroy documents), 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (obstructing and endeavoring to obstruct inquiries by 
the House of Representatives), and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (making a false statement to Congress). 
United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 18, 24 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 56. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. at 31; North, 910 F.2d at 843.  
 57. North, 901 F.2d at 901–02. North was primarily challenging the district court’s 
implementation of CIPA—namely, its refusal to “order the United States to provide the 
defendant with the information it expects to use to rebut the classified information” pursuant to 
§ 6(f) of CIPA. North, 910 F.2d at 899. The D.C. Circuit found this to be a harmless error, but 
also seemed dismissive of the notion that the § 6 burdens were nonreciprocal. See id. at 903 
(“[CIPA] is consistent with the ‘salutary’ development of ‘a system of liberal discovery which 
gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information . . . and thereby reduces the 
possibility of surprise at trial.’” (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473–74 (1973))).  
 58. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). 
 59. Id. at 472. 
 60. Id. at 474 n.6.  
 61. Id. at 475 n.9. 
 62. North, 910 F.2d at 902 n.41 (citing Wardius, 412 U.S. at 475).  
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countervailing state interest existed, in CIPA cases “‘the State’s 
inherent information-gathering advantages’ are matched by the 
defendant’s opportunities for engaging in ‘greymail’ to derail 
legitimate prosecutions.”63 
Poindexter’s constitutional challenge to CIPA was more 
comprehensive. He argued, inter alia, that the Section 5 notice 
requirements violated his federal constitutional rights to remain 
silent, to testify in his own defense, to cross-examine witnesses against 
him, and to receive due process of law.64 All of these claims were 
rejected.65 
Poindexter first construed Brooks v. Tennessee66 to support the 
notion that CIPA impermissibly burdened his Fifth Amendment 
rights to remain silent and to testify in his own defense.67 In Brooks, 
the Supreme Court held that a statute requiring a defendant to testify 
as the first defense witness or not at all was “an impermissible 
restriction on the defendant’s right against self-incrimination, ‘to 
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of 
his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.’”68 The 
statute “exact[ed] a price for [the defendant’s] silence by keeping him 
off the stand entirely unless he [chose] to testify first.”69 Thus, the 
Court held that the challenged law “cut[] down on the privilege [to 
remain silent] by making its assertion costly.”70 The Poindexter court 
declined to apply Brooks, distinguishing CIPA on the basis that the 
statute does not compel the defendant to reveal “when he will testify, 
or even whether he will testify.”71 Rather, all he must do under CIPA 
is identify the classified information on which he intends to rely.72  
 
 63. Id. (citations omitted); see also infra Part III.B. 
 64. United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 31 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972). 
 67. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. at 33.  
 68. Brooks, 406 U.S. at 609 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)) (alteration in 
original). 
 69. Id. at 610. 
 70. Id. at 611 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)) (alterations in 
original). 
 71. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. at 33. 
 72. Id. The court also noted that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sometimes 
require defendants to disclose elements of their defense in advance of trial. Id. “Examples of 
such requirements are FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (alibi defense); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 (insanity 
defense); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.3 (public-authority defense); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (medical and 
scientific tests, tangible objects, and certain documents).” Id. “Provisions requiring the 
revelation of such defenses in advance of trial have consistently been held to be constitutional.” 
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The court likewise rejected Poindexter’s contention that CIPA 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against 
him by forcing him to disclose to the prosecution both the classified 
information that he intended to elicit from prosecution witnesses on 
cross-examination and all the classified information contained in 
defense counsel’s questions to those witnesses.73 The problem with 
this argument (in the court’s estimation) was that it assumed that 
defendants enjoy “an unqualified right to undiminished surprise with 
respect to . . . cross-examination, and that if there is any impairment 
of the element of surprise, however slight, cross-examination must be 
regarded as per se ineffective.”74 This assumption, the court warned, 
misapprehended the role of the Confrontation Clause.75 
Finally, as to Poindexter’s claim that CIPA’s disclosure 
requirements deprived him of due process by imposing a “one-sided 
burden,” the court concluded that “CIPA burdens are not one-sided, 
but they are carefully balanced, and there is therefore no basis for a 
due process complaint.”76 Despite the entirely conclusory nature of 
the Poindexter court’s statement that CIPA burdens are “carefully 
balanced,” this language has been heavily cited in subsequent cases. 
For instance, in United States v. Ivy,77 a defendant charged with 
violating the Arms Export Control Act challenged the 
constitutionality of the notice and hearing requirements of Sections 5 
and 6 of CIPA as applied to him.78 The Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania relied on Poindexter to deny this challenge in an 
opinion closely tracking Poindexter’s language and organizational 
structure.79 Similarly, in United States v. Lee,80 the defendant was a 
 
Id. The Poindexter court’s analysis is weakened somewhat by the fact that the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, unlike CIPA, safeguard a defendant’s right to pretrial silence by declining 
to use exclusion of a defendant’s testimony as a sanction. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(e) (“This 
rule shall not limit the right of the defendant to testify.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.3(c) (“This rule 
does not limit the defendant’s right to testify.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(d) (clarifying that in the 
case of an undisclosed insanity defense, exclusion of evidence is expressly limited to testimony 
of expert witnesses). 
 73. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. at 34 (citation omitted). 
 74. Id.  
 75. See id. (“The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, 
the defense might wish.” (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986))).  
 76. Id. at 35 (citation omitted).  
 77. United States v. Ivy, No. 91-00602-04, 1993 WL 316215 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1993). 
 78. Id. at *1. 
 79. See id. at *1–*7 (relying on Poindexter in evaluating Ivy’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
claims). 
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scientist charged with transmitting American nuclear secrets to 
China. The District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed 
his CIPA challenge by relying almost entirely on Poindexter and Ivy.81 
As a result, a loosely supported conclusion by one district court that 
CIPA burdens are “carefully balanced”82 has snowballed into a 
voluminous and well-developed body of case law. 
2. The Problematic Application of Poindexter to the Terrorism 
Context. Despite the fact that Poindexter was decided in 1989 and 
written while contemplating discovery between the government and a 
highly sophisticated senior intelligence officer, courts have applied its 
reasoning to terrorism cases without hesitation. In United States v. Bin 
Laden,83 the Southern District of New York invoked Poindexter 
nearly a dozen times in denying CIPA challenges by three terrorism 
defendants.84 The court found Poindexter applicable despite 
recognizing that the two cases involved disanalogous defendants—
John Poindexter was national security advisor, and the classified 
evidence in that case was equally known to both sides.85 Curiously, the 
Bin Laden court even noted that CIPA’s legislative history suggests 
that it was intended primarily for cases in which the defendant 
already possessed classified information.86 Nonetheless, the court did 
not consider whether shifting contexts might affect the balance of 
discovery burdens.87 Instead, the court concluded that although the 
facts of Poindexter were “significantly different,” the same general 
 
 80. United States v. Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (D.N.M. 2000). 
 81. See id. at 1327–29 (citing heavily to Poindexter and Ivy in determining that Sections 5 
and 6 of CIPA were not unconstitutional as applied). 
 82. United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 35 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 83. United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023 LBS, 2001 WL 66393 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
25, 2001). 
 84. Id. at *1–2, *5–6, *8.  
 85. Id. at *6 n.5. Terrorism defendants, on the other hand, are normally not privy to 
classified information and cannot access certain evidence against them except through the 
government. 
 86. Id. at *2.  
 87. Indeed, the court’s recognition that “the situation presented here is different from the 
usual CIPA case”—that terrorism defendants do not already possess classified information—
was not a recognition that terrorism defendants may be uniquely affected by CIPA’s statutory 
requirements. See id. Instead, this issue was raised because “[t]he Government claim[ed] that 
this difference—the fact that the Defendants have had ‘no prior access to the classified 
information’—necessitates that the Court continue to prohibit the disclosure of the classified 
information to the Defendants.” Id.  
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principles applied.88 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision to deny this as-applied challenge to CIPA.89 
Perhaps the most notable terrorism case involving CIPA is 
United States v. Moussaoui.90 Zacarias Moussaoui, an al-Qaeda 
member charged with conspiracy to commit international terrorism, 
was arrested before the 9/11 attacks, but was sentenced afterward, 
thus “straddl[ing] two eras in American counterterrorism.”91 
Moussaoui’s legal challenge to CIPA was unique in that it did not 
dispute the notice and hearing requirements of Sections 5 and 6, but 
instead challenged prosecutors’ ability to provide written summaries 
as substitutes for the testimony of potential defense witnesses. 
Because approximately 75 percent of the indictment concerned the 
events of September 11th, Moussaoui needed the testimony of several 
detainees to exonerate himself.92 The government offered 
substitutions for witness testimony pursuant to CIPA, arguing that a 
strong national-security interest foreclosed granting Moussaoui direct 
access to detainees.93 The district court rejected the proposed 
substitution, finding the government’s written summaries unreliable 
and flawed in numerous respects.94 The court further found that the 
defense had made a sufficient showing that the detainees in question 
could offer testimony that would undermine the government’s 
contention that Moussaoui had participated in 9/11.95 Because the 
United States “deprived Moussaoui of any opportunity to present 
critical testimony from the detainees at issue in defense of his life,” 
the court eliminated the death penalty as a possible sentence.96 It also 
prohibited the prosecution from arguing that Moussaoui had any 
knowledge of or involvement in the 9/11 attacks.97 
 
 88. Id. at *6 n.5. 
 89. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 156 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 90. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 91. Radsan, supra note 3, at 439. 
 92. United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 482−83 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, remanded, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004), opinion amended on reh’g, 382 F.3d 453 
(4th Cir. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 93. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458 n.5. 
 94. Id. at 459. 
 95. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 486. 
 96. Id. at 487. 
 97. Id. These sanctions were necessary because the government made clear that it would 
not produce witnesses for deposition despite the district court’s finding that testimony from such 
witnesses could be material to Moussaoui’s defense. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 476. “Although 
dismissal is the presumptive sanction contemplated by CIPA when a defendant is prevented 
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court’s ruling in 
part, acknowledging that Moussaoui had a Sixth Amendment right to 
cross-examine the detainees, but rejecting the argument that written 
substitutions would be “inherently inadequate.”98 The court 
remanded for a reformulation of the substitutions in an acceptable 
manner, instructing that the “compiling of substitutions be an 
interactive process among the parties and the district court,” that the 
substitutions use the exact language of the government’s written 
summaries, and that the government refrain from creating 
substitutions “larded with inculpatory information under the guise of 
[the rule of] completeness.”99 The court further ordered that 
substitutions be admitted only by Moussaoui, and that the trial court 
retain full discretion to determine admissibility.100 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Moussaoui—that CIPA’s 
procedures for written substitutions of witness testimony can 
adequately preserve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights—has 
come under criticism.101 Notably, implicit in the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision is the assumption that “the import of [the Sixth Amendment 
cross-examination] right” lies in “the content of the evidence,” which 
disregards “the importance of the form of presentation.”102 It is 
difficult to imagine how a written summary could achieve the same 
benefits as the live presence of a witness, which allows a jury to 
directly hear cross-examination and “take measure of the demeanor 
and appearance of the witness.”103 Nonetheless, as of yet, no court has 
rejected Moussaoui’s Sixth Amendment holding. 
C. CIPA’s Interplay with FISA 
CIPA is very frequently invoked in cases involving the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, because FISA-generated materials are 
 
from disclosing classified information found to be material and favorable,” Moussaoui, 282 F. 
Supp. 2d at 482–83, the district court believed “that a more measured approach [was] required.” 
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 476. 
 98. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 478. 
 99. Id. at 479–81. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See, e.g., Brian McEvoy, Note, Classified Evidence and the Confrontation Clause: 
Correcting a Misapplication of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 395, 
414–20 (2005). 
 102. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).  
 103. Id. at 417. 
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initially classified.104 Indeed, FISA is used in 61 percent of national-
security or terrorism-associated prosecutions involving CIPA.105 As a 
result, to properly analyze CIPA, it is important to gain a basic 
understanding of FISA and its implications.106 
FISA107 was enacted in 1978 to establish procedures that the 
government must follow when conducting electronic surveillance for 
foreign-intelligence purposes within the United States.108 To authorize 
such surveillance, FISA established the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC).109 A FISC judge may approve the use of 
electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence if there is 
probable cause to believe that the proposed target of electronic 
surveillance is a “foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”110 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) has 
the authority to review the denial of any application under FISA.111 
Such denials, though, are exceedingly rare—for the first twenty-four 
years of the court’s existence, no application was ever denied, and the 
first ever review (in 2002) was of an application that was merely 
modified.112 Although recently a few applications have been denied or 
withdrawn every year, the approval rate has not even come close to 
dipping below 99 percent in any year.113 In practice, then, the FISC 
serves as little more than a rubber stamp for government 
surveillance.114 
 
 104. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2009, at 27 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 Terrorist Trial Report 
Card], available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/documents/02_TTRCFinalJan142.
pdf. 
 105. See id. (percentage calculated from underlying data). 
 106. See generally Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How 
Secrecy and Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & 
ETHICS J. 81 (2003) (providing background on CIPA’s interplay with FISA).  
 107. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). 
 108. Keith G. Logan, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, in 1 BATTLEGROUND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 287 (Gregg Barak ed., 2007). 
 109. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a. 
 110. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 722 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 
2002). The term “foreign power” includes, inter alia, “a group engaged in international 
terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4). 
 111. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b). 
 112. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719 (noting that this was the first appeal since the 
passage of FISA). 
 113. See Logan, supra note 108, at 292. The approval rate hit an all-time low of 99.7 percent 
in 2003. Id. 
 114. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1159 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]o exercise this capacity [to surveil] the Government must have intelligence court 
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The government’s applications submitted to the FISC are 
classified, as are the overwhelming majority of the court’s orders.115 
As a result, when the government prosecutes a suspected terrorist 
after conducting electronic surveillance, all FISA intercepts—which 
comprise the majority of evidence in the case—will be classified. 
Thus, CIPA and its procedures are implicated in such prosecutions.116 
III.  CIPA AND TERRORISM: A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERN 
The events of September 11, 2001 had a profound effect on 
federal prosecutorial priorities. Indeed, in the decade following 9/11, 
the Department of Justice indicted more than one thousand 
defendants in terrorism prosecutions.117 This trend has shown no signs 
of subsiding, as the number of jihadist-related terrorism prosecutions 
doubled in 2009 and 2010.118 Significantly, 23 percent of terrorism 
prosecutions since 9/11 have involved CIPA.119 This Section explores 
the constitutional concerns raised by CIPA when it is used in the 
terrorism context, and how this shift has fundamentally altered the 
balance of interests originally thought to justify the statute’s more 
restrictive provisions. This Part first documents how the problem of 
overclassification, coupled with the type of classified information in 
CIPA cases, makes the statute’s application in the terrorism context 
far more problematic than in the typical espionage case. It then 
details how the governmental interests weighing against defendants’ 
procedural rights have waned significantly as the government has 
 
authorization. But the Government rarely files requests that fail to meet the statutory 
criteria.”). 
 115. See In re Motion For Release of Court Records, No. Misc. 07-01 at *6 (FISA Ct. Dec. 7, 
2011), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/fisc_order_2007_1211.pdf 
(holding that there is no public right of access to FISC records). 
 116. See, e.g., Motion for Order Declaring the Classified Information Procedures Act 
Unconstitutional (DE 111) at 3, United States v. Qazi, No. 12-6098, (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2013), 
available at https://ecf.flsd.uscourts.gov (explaining how the use of FISA prompted classification 
of discovery materials and the application of CIPA). 
 117. See CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT 
CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2011, at 7 n.2 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 Terrorist 
Trial Report Card], available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/TTRC%20
Ten%20Year%20Issue.pdf. This number includes 578 defendants who were “formally or 
informally associated with an Islamist terror group—whether one with a global jihadist ideology 
(i.e. Al Qaeda), or a local Islamist movement (i.e. Hamas).” Id. at 7 n.1. The remaining five-
hundred-plus terrorism prosecutions involve terror cases without an identifiable link to jihadist 
crimes. Id. at 7 n.2.  
 118. Id. at 2.  
 119. Id. at 13.  
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prosecuted fewer insiders and more outsiders in CIPA cases. As a 
result, CIPA may now be unconstitutional as applied in terrorism 
prosecutions, particularly due to problems of nonreciprocal discovery 
obligations and ineffective assistance of counsel. 
A. The Proliferation of the Executive Classification Privilege and the 
Role of Classified Information in Terrorism Trials 
A phenomenon that has made CIPA’s use more problematic in 
the last decade (especially in relation to terrorism cases) is the 
explosion of document-classification decisions.120 The number of 
classified documents doubled in the decade from 1997–2007, with 14.2 
million documents classified in 2005 alone.121 “That’s 39,000 a day, or 
1,600 every hour of the night and day.”122 
The questionable nature of these classification decisions is well 
documented.123 When members of the public petition agencies to 
review documents for declassification (through a process known as 
mandatory declassification review), those documents are declassified 
92 percent of the time.124 Former National Security Council Executive 
Secretary Rodney McDaniel estimated that only 10 percent of 
classification decisions were actually made for “legitimate protection 
of secrets.”125 Nonetheless, four out of five documents classified in 
2005 were designated “Secret” or “Top Secret.”126 Information is 
classified at this level when its disclosure could reasonably be 
expected to threaten national security.127 The absurdity of some 
classification decisions is illustrated by a memo from a member of the 
 
 120. For background on overclassification, see generally TED GUP, NATION OF SECRETS: 
THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 98–130 (2007); Alex 
Rossmiller, Adjudicating Classified Information, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1275, 1293–97 (2011); 
William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallito, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85 
(2005). 
 121. GUP, supra note 120, at 8. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Weaver & Pallito, supra note 120, at 87 (“Virtually all observers acknowledge that 
overclassification is a significant problem . . . .”).  
 124. See INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2010 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 20 (2011) (“As a 
result of initial MDR processing, only 285,418 pages (8 percent) remained classified in their 
entirety after an initial MDR review.”). 
 125. COMM’N ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOV’T SECRECY, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. Doc. No. 105-2, at 
36 (1997). 
 126. GUP, supra note 120, at 8. 
 127. Id. 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff claiming that too many documents were being 
classified, which was in turn classified itself.128 
In CIPA cases, evidence is often classified because it is derived 
from FISA surveillance,129 meaning that access to evidence is 
restricted because of how the government acquired it. As one 
defendant argued in the Southern District of Florida, 
Many sections of the [Government’s] proposed order are written so 
broadly as to potentially encompass Mr. Khan’s own words either 
telephonically or in written form . . . . Paragraph 4(B) of the 
proposed protective order . . . defines what is “classified 
information.” It includes documents that were “once in the 
possession of a private party, which has been derived from a United 
States Government classified document, information, or material, 
regardless of whether such document, information, or material has 
itself subsequently been classified by the Government pursuant to 
Executive Order 12958 or its predecessor orders as 
“CONFIDENTIAL” or “SECRET.”130 
Thus, the classified information at issue in CIPA hearings may be 
derived from the defendant’s own speech, which the defendant 
consequently cannot use as evidence without the United States’ 
permission.131 This leads to the strange result, as detailed above, that a 
defendant’s own phone calls, emails, internet searches, or social-
media messages may be subject to CIPA’s Section 5 notice 
 
 128. H.R. REP. NO. 92-1633, pt. 1, at 20 (1973), Other instances include the classification of a 
2006 cable from a U.S. diplomat describing a wedding he attended in Dagestan:  
The paragraph describing a typical Dagestani wedding was classified as 
‘Confidential,’ meaning that its release ‘reasonably could be expected to cause damage 
to the national security.’ The paragraph included the following classified observations: 
‘Dagestani weddings . . . take place in discrete parts over three days. On the first day 
the groom’s family and the bride’s family simultaneously hold separate receptions. . . . 
The next day, the groom’s parents hold another reception, this time for the bride’s 
family and friends, who can ‘inspect’ the family they have given their daughter to. On 
the third day, the bride’s family holds a reception for the groom’s parents and family.’  
Elizabeth Goitein & David M. Shapiro, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Reducing Overclassification 
Through Accountability 6 (2011) (emphasis added), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
publication/reducing-overclassification-through-accountability. 
 129. See supra Part II.C. 
 130. Defendant Hafiz Muhammad Sher Ali Khan’s Response to Government’s Motion for 
Protective Order on CIPA Materials at 3 (DE 101), United States v. Khan (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 
2011) (No. 11-20331) (emphasis added), available at https://ecf.flsd.uscourts.gov. 
 131. Id. at 2.  
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requirement because they were obtained or derived from FISA 
surveillance.132 
CIPA may be just a procedural statute, but the informational 
asymmetry it creates—magnified by the nature and volume of 
classified information in terrorism cases—confers a rather significant 
advantage upon prosecutors. So although CIPA may very well be 
neutral on paper, it could certainly “be used instrumentally in an 
advocacy context”133 to stack the deck against a defendant. 
B. The Balance of Interests in Terrorism Prosecutions 
CIPA’s constitutionality has long been settled.134 Nevertheless, as 
discussed above, the climate of overclassification135 and the nature of 
evidence in terrorism prosecutions have substantially increased the 
burden CIPA imposes on outsider defendants. CIPA has been used in 
more than 140 terrorism cases since 9/11.136 Accordingly, an 
examination of the constitutional ramifications of this contextual shift 
is necessary. This Section expounds on the nature of CIPA’s 
contextual shift and the diminution of the governmental interests that 
 
 132. An example of this problem is illustrated by the predicament of defense counsel in 
United States v. Khan: “Based upon the indictment the bulk of the ‘classified’ information will 
be Mr. Khan’s own words as he speaks on the phone overseas . . . [and] could include 
acquaintances of Mr. Khan or methods of communication such as email, text, social media, or 
faxes.” Motion to Strike Use of CIPA as Unconstitutional at 6, United States v. Khan (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 30, 2011) (No. 11-20331). In United States v. Al-Hussayen, No. CR03-048-C-EJL, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29793 (D. Idaho Apr. 6, 2004), the classified information at issue spanned eighty-
nine CDs in Arabic, consisting of Al-Hussayen’s own emails and telephone conversations. In 
United States v. Al-Arian, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2003), the government refused 
to declassify twenty-one thousand hours of the defendant’s own communications. For more 
background on the government’s tactical classification of FISA intercepts, see Joshua L. Dratel, 
Symposium: Secret Evidence and the Courts in the Age of National Security: Sword or Shield? 
The Government’s Selective Use of its Declassification Authority for Tactical Advantage in 
Criminal Prosecutions, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 171, 175 (2006). 
 133. Pilchen & Klubes, supra note 38, at 194.  
 134. See United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 32 (D.D.C. 1989) (“Every court that 
has passed on the constitutionality of CIPA has upheld it.”). 
 135. The overclassification problem worsened in the wake of 9/11. According to the 2007 
testimony of Mark Agrast, later Deputy Assistant Attorney General and current executive 
director of the American Society of International Law, “there were nearly three times as many 
classification actions in 2004 as in the last year of the Clinton presidency,” and “while Clinton 
declassified nearly a billion pages of historical material, the pace has slowed to a trickle in the 
last six years.” Over-Classification and Pseudo-Classification: Making DHS the Gold Standard 
for Designating Classified and Sensitive Information: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Intelligence, Info. Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland. Sec., 
110th Cong. 94 (2007) (testimony of Mark D. Agrast, Senior Fellow, Ctr. for Am. Progress). 
 136. 2009 Terrorist Trial Report Card, supra note 104, at 27. 
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previously justified more onerous burdens on defendants. This 
Section also presents two ways in which outsider prosecutions 
implicating CIPA may run afoul of the Constitution. Part III.B.1 
argues that CIPA could violate outsider defendants’ due-process 
rights by imposing nonreciprocal discovery burdens in the absence of 
a sufficiently strong governmental interest. Part III.B.2 contends that 
CIPA could similarly erode an outsider defendant’s right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. 
The crux of the contextual shift is that CIPA has transitioned 
from typically insider cases to outsider ones.137 In insider cases, the 
defendants (government officials or intelligence operatives) 
“previously had access to the classified information and the access to 
the classified information was for work-related conduct.”138 On the 
other hand, in outsider cases—typically relating to terrorism or 
international drug conspiracies—the defendants “never had and 
never will have access to the material.”139 In this latter category of 
cases, the defendants are not capable of “graymailing,” as they 
“cannot reveal classified information other than that provided in 
discovery.”140 Indeed, the type of evidence at issue in CIPA cases 
today rarely concerns the vital state secrets that graymailers 
threatened to expose in CIPA’s infancy. 
The most significant constitutional implication of this transition 
from insider to outsider cases is that it fundamentally alters the 
governmental interests that weigh against criminal defendants’ rights. 
This shift bolsters the recurring argument made by defendants that 
CIPA violates their right to due process by imposing nonreciprocal 
discovery obligations. As the D.C. Circuit explained in United States 
v. North,141 “CIPA was specifically designed to minimize the need to 
forego prosecution[s] . . . in order to avoid compromising national 
security information,” and this strong state interest may justify 
 
 137. Yaroshefsky, supra note 4, at 1067. 
 138. Id. “In such cases, the government typically produces all the classified information to 
security-cleared defense counsel and the defendant, who himself has security clearance for 
access to the classified documents, reviews the evidence with his lawyer.” Id. at 1067–68 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, CIPA balances the competing interests effectively in insider 
cases by affording the defendant “basic Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, while preserving the 
government’s national security concerns.” Id. at 1068. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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nonreciprocal discovery obligations.142 This concern, if not entirely 
ameliorated in terrorism prosecutions, is hardly as compelling as it 
once was. It is a rare terrorism defendant who possesses sensitive 
national-security information. 
As for classified information that the government possesses, it is 
important to remember that the purpose of CIPA was not to allow 
the government to persist in prosecutions when it is disinclined to 
disclose exculpatory information that threatens national security. 
Instead, Congress wished to ensure that classified information “which 
bears no possible relationship to the issues in a criminal trial is not 
disclosed,” and that relevant classified information is identified 
before revelation so that the “Government can make an informed 
decision” on whether prosecuting is worth the risk of public 
disclosure.143 
In terrorism cases, because only the government possesses the 
classified information from the start, it may reach “an informed 
decision” on the benefits of prosecution before disclosing sensitive 
information to the defendant. If the government wanted to avail itself 
of other protections afforded by CIPA (such as the ability to request 
a substitution of a classified document with a summary), it could 
certainly do so without requiring the defendant to provide a roadmap 
of the defense under Section 5. If the government itself possessed 
discoverable exculpatory information, the disclosure of which could 
threaten national security, it is hard to imagine that it would need the 
defendant to identify that issue. Such a scenario could be easily 
resolved before the defense is even privy to such information, 
through an ex parte Section 4 hearing to “delete specified items of 
classified information from documents to be made available to the 
defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.”144 If the trial court ruled that such information was 
discoverable after a Section 4 hearing, the government would not 
need the defendant to disclose his defense before it sought to 
substitute that information with a written summary. 
In Wardius v. Oregon, the Supreme Court noted that “the State’s 
inherent information-gathering advantages suggest that if there is to 
be any imbalance in discovery rights, it should work in the 
 
 142. Id. at 902 n.41 (quotations omitted). 
 143. 126 CONG. REC. 26,503 (1980) (statement of Rep. Romano Mazzoli, floor manager of 
the bill for the House) (emphasis added). 
 144. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 4 (2012). 
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defendant’s favor.”145 Responding to the applicability of Wardius, the 
North court observed that “the State’s inherent information gathering 
advantages are matched by the defendant’s opportunities for 
engaging in ‘greymail’ to derail legitimate prosecutions.”146 This 
sensible reasoning, which assured the rejection of first-generation 
CIPA challenges, has little relevance to today’s outsider cases. Even 
in the very rare instances when discovery provides a terrorism 
defendant with graymail material, the government cannot exclude 
relevant defense information anyway.147 Thus, the prospect of 
graymail could hardly be deemed a defense advantage sufficient to 
justify nonreciprocal discovery burdens as North suggests—it is a 
consequence of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which apply 
in every federal criminal action.148 
Further, given that a defendant can use only that classified 
information that is relevant and helpful to his defense, using such 
information hardly constitutes “engaging in ‘greymail’ to derail 
legitimate prosecutions.”149 When the government gives a defendant a 
classified document that the Federal Rules entitle him to deploy in 
furtherance of his defense, it is of little consequence that the 
government would prefer it remain undisclosed to the public. CIPA 
was never intended to prevent disclosure when the information is 
necessary to the defense. Certainly, this scenario is incomparable to 
insider cases, in which intelligence officers or government employees 
actively threaten to expose immaterial state secrets from their own 
knowledge. 
CIPA was not designed to relieve the government from deciding 
whether to prosecute or avoid disclosure; on the contrary, it was 
designed to facilitate that decision by ensuring open information.150 
 
 145. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 n.9 (1973). 
 146. North, 910 F.2d at 902 n.41 (quotation omitted).  
 147. Because CIPA does not change the standards for admissibility or discoverability, the 
government cannot withhold exculpatory information merely because it would threaten national 
security. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis (Yunis II), 867 F.2d 617, 621–22 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“This 
Section creates no new rights of or limits on discovery of a specific area of classified 
information.”); 126 CONG. REC. H9308 (1980) (statement of Rep. Romano Mazzoli, floor 
manager of the bill for the House) (explaining that CIPA “does not alter the existing standards 
for determining relevance or admissibility”). 
 148. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (governing discovery and disclosure obligations in criminal 
proceedings). 
 149. North, 910 F.2d at 902 n.41. 
 150. See House Hearings, supra note 15, at 2 (stating that the proposed legislation was 
“designed to eliminate the guesswork, surprise and fear” from deciding whether to prosecute). 
CHANDRAN IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2015  11:28 AM 
2015] CIPA IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 1435 
When the government already possesses the information, the 
defendant’s Section 5 notice should have no bearing on the 
government’s “informed decision” to prosecute. The government is 
already as “informed” as it will be after such notice. 
1. Nonreciprocal Discovery Obligations.  As detailed extensively 
above, the countervailing governmental interests that exist in 
espionage cases are rarely present in terrorism prosecutions.151 Thus, 
if the discovery burdens imposed by CIPA are not reciprocal, the 
statute may be susceptible to as-applied constitutional challenges in 
the prosecution of outsiders. Indeed, the Supreme Court is 
“particularly suspicious” of “trial rules which provide nonreciprocal 
benefits to the [government] when the lack of reciprocity interferes 
with the defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial.”152 
The Poindexter court declared that CIPA burdens are “not one-
sided,” but are instead “carefully balanced.”153 This is because under 
CIPA, when a defendant provides Section 5 notice of the classified 
information he intends to disclose or cause disclosure of at trial, the 
trial court must order the prosecution to provide the defendant with 
the information it expects to use to rebut his classified information.154 
Indeed, “It is crystal clear, then, that disclosure provisions of CIPA 
would be unconstitutional if the reciprocity section were not part of 
the Act.”155 
Still, defendants have argued that CIPA’s reciprocity provisions 
are constitutionally inadequate. As National Security Agency (NSA) 
whistleblower Thomas Drake argued in his trial, the notice 
requirements of Sections 5 and 6 violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment by “imposing ill-defined, one-sided notice and 
hearing obligations on the defense that do nothing to enhance the 
accuracy of the fact-finding process.”156 Drake further argued that the 
reciprocity provision is functionally nonreciprocal for two reasons.  
 
 151. Other countervailing governmental interests that may be implicated in these cases are 
discussed at the end of this Subsection. 
 152. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 n.6 (1973). 
 153. United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 35 (D.D.C. 1989). 
 154. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(f) (2012). 
 155. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Wald, C.J., dissenting).  
 156. Motion for a Declaration that Sections 5 and 6 of the Classified Information 
Procedures Act Are Unconstitutional at 14, United States v. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d 909 (D. Md. 
2011) (No. 1:10-cr-0181-RDB) [hereinafter CIPA Motion]. 
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First, the “government controls the scope of a defendant’s notice 
obligation under CIPA through its power to decide what information 
will be classified.”157 Because neither defendants nor courts can 
challenge such classifications,158 the government may effectively 
exercise “significant control over the extent to which the defense will 
be compelled to disclose and explain its case” through its 
classification decisions.159 “The more information that the government 
classifies, the greater the defendant’s notice-and-hearing obligations 
under CIPA.”160 
Second, Drake pointed out that the decision to convene a 
Section 6(a) pretrial hearing on the use, relevance, or admissibility of 
classified information is entirely within the prosecution’s discretion. 
Moreover, Section 6(f)’s reciprocity provision is limited by the fact 
that the government may identify the specific classified information at 
issue in a Section 6 hearing.161 Drake explained: 
If the prosecution, in its sole discretion, chooses to request a hearing 
as to some or all of the classified information listed in the 
defendant’s § 5(a) notice, and if at the hearing (following the 
defendant’s explanation) the court determines that some portion of 
the listed information is relevant and admissible at trial, then as to 
that information only “the court shall . . . order the United States to 
provide the defendant with the information it expects to use to rebut 
the classified information.”162 
Thus, Drake argued, the prosecution may reap the benefits of a 
defendant’s Section 5 notice, “hearing many details of his case” and 
excluding parts of that disclosure from the Section 6 hearing, thereby 
limiting the government’s reciprocal discovery obligations.163 As 
another defendant similarly argued, CIPA imposes a one-sided 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d 1215, 1217 (4th Cir. 1984) (“[D]efendants cannot 
challenge this classification. A court cannot question it.”), rev’d on other grounds, 780 F.2d 1102 
(4th Cir. 1985). 
 159. CIPA Motion, supra note 156, at 15–16. 
 160. Id.; see also Dratel, supra note 132, at 173 (“Unfettered government discretion . . . 
permits the government to use its unreviewable classification authority as an offensive weapon, 
effectively placing voluminous amounts of critical evidence off limits to the defense.”); United 
States v. George, No. 91-0521, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9632, at *2 (D.D.C. June 24, 1992) (“[T]he 
CIPA process is strangely one-sided; the government may declassify any information it wishes, 
for whatever reason, if it suits the needs of the prosecution.”).   
 161. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(b)(1) (2012). 
 162. CIPA Motion, supra note 156, at 15.  
 163. Id. at 16. 
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burden on the defendant because notwithstanding the reciprocity 
requirement, “the amount (if any) of disclosed rebuttal information is 
entirely within the control of his adversary.”164 
Curiously, neither the government in its Response, nor the 
district court in its Order, addressed either of Drake’s arguments in 
responding to his reciprocity challenge.165 Perhaps the most noticeable 
defect of the “reciprocal” burdens of CIPA in outsider cases is that 
the government already possesses the classified information that 
would be presented in a defendant’s Section 5 notice. Because FISA 
is used in nearly 60 percent of terrorism-associated prosecutions 
involving CIPA,166 the classified documents that a defendant will have 
access to at trial are usually his own communications contained in 
FISA intercepts. The government will have reviewed this information 
long before the defendant ever has access to it, but a defendant must 
still “specifically set out the classified information [he] believes he will 
rely upon in his defense,”167 and counsel must explain her theories of 
the anticipated use and relevance of that information.168 Thus, CIPA 
effectively allows the government to elicit defense counsel’s theory of 
the case under the pretense of preventing the “government [from 
being] subject to surprise at what may be revealed in the defense,”169 
 
 164. Motion for Order Declaring the Classified Information Procedures Act 
Unconstitutional (DE 111) at 7, United States v. Qazi, No. 12-6098 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2013).  
 165. See United States’ Response to Defendant’s Motion for a Declaration that Sections 5 
and 6 of CIPA are Unconstitutional as Applied at 1, United States v. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d 909 
(D. Md. 2011) (No. 1:10-cr-00181-RDB); Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 914–15. Instead, the court 
simply used generic language that seemed to respond more to arguments raised by the 
defendants in United States v. Ivy, No. Crim. A. 91-00602-04, 1993 WL 316215, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 12, 1993), and United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 976 (4th Cir. 1983), than by Thomas 
Drake. Noting that Wardius condemned only those procedures wherein the overall balance of 
discovery burdens tipped against the defendant, the court concluded that CIPA’s burdens were 
“carefully balanced,” reasoning that “[CIPA] authorizes this Court to impose upon the 
Government a continuing duty to disclose rebuttal evidence or have such evidence 
excluded . . . . [T]he Government must also comply with the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and Brady v. Maryland.” Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 915 (citations omitted). The court 
failed to acknowledge Drake’s arguments that CIPA’s burdens are nonreciprocal because the 
government controls the defendant’s notice requirements through its power to classify, and 
because it can manipulate its reciprocal discovery obligations through its unbridled discretion in 
requesting a Section 6 hearing. See id. at 914–15.  
 166. Percentage calculated from data compiled in 2009 Terrorist Trial Report Card, supra 
note 104. 
 167. United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 168. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(a) (2012). 
 169. United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983). 
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even though in most cases the defendant could not possibly reveal 
any classified information that would “surprise” the government. 
Contrary to what the Poindexter court assumed,170 the argument 
that defense counsel should not have to provide a roadmap of the 
defense is decidedly not based on the premise that the defense enjoys 
a procedural right to surprise the prosecution. Rather, the 
constitutional prohibition against this kind of disclosure stems both 
from the defendant’s right to pretrial silence,171 and even more so 
from the due-process prohibition against nonreciprocal discovery 
burdens. Section 6(f)’s reciprocity clause is unbalanced from the start, 
since the government has no obligation to furnish the defense with 
information regarding the “use, relevance, or admissibility” of 
rebuttal material, as the defense must do for the government under 
Section 6(a).172 Indeed, it appears that the government can satisfy its 
reciprocity obligations with a mere document dump, whereas the 
defendant must make an exhaustive disclosure “with particularity.”173 
Such skewed burdens cannot be reconciled with the Wardius Court’s 
instruction that any imbalance in discovery rights should “work in the 
defendant’s favor.”174 
It is also worth reiterating that this analysis is only compelling 
within the sphere of terrorism and other outsider prosecutions. In 
standard insider cases, the government’s interest in not being 
graymailed has been held to outweigh the harm caused by unbalanced 
discovery burdens. Wardius was, after all, decided in the absence of 
any showing of strong state interests.175 Unless some other compelling 
state interest were at play, Wardius would render nonreciprocal 
discovery burdens unconstitutional as applied to outsider defendants. 
As the Supreme Court has noted, “it is obvious and unarguable that 
no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the 
 
 170. See United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 34 (D.D.C. 1989) (“This argument 
assumes that defendant has an unqualified right to undiminished surprise with respect to his 
cross-examination.”). 
 171. See supra Part II.B.; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 172. See 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(f) (requiring the United States to disclose the “information it 
expects to use to rebut the classified information”).  
 173. Collins, 720 F.2d at 1199. 
 174. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 n.9 (1973). The common response to invocations 
of Wardius is that the case was decided in a context with an “absence of a strong showing of 
state interests.” Id. at 475. But as this Subsection argues, the state interests particular to CIPA 
cases are eroded (if not entirely eliminated) in terrorism prosecutions. 
 175. Id. at 475. 
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Nation.”176 Undoubtedly, in the realm of counterterrorism and 
national security, some state secrets could cause irreparable damage if 
disclosed. Moreover, certain defendants might seek to aid a larger 
jihadist conspiracy by attempting to relay to other conspirators useful 
classified information produced to them in discovery. Nonetheless, 
for two reasons, these state interests will rarely be compelling. 
First, these concerns apply to very few defendants. Although 
they may be meaningful for the Zacarias Moussaouis of the world, 
they are of little relevance to self-radicalized individuals and the two-
thirds of all terrorism defendants who have either no link to jihadist 
crimes or no identifiable affiliation with a terrorist organization.177 
Only around 9 percent of all terrorism defendants have a formal or 
informal association with al-Qaeda,178 and even this number is inflated 
by increasing use of the charge of material support for terrorism.179 
Second, it is very unlikely that a FISA intercept in a civilian 
terrorism prosecution would contain perilous state secrets. Data 
collected from surveillance of a defendant is unlikely to contain 
anything but information about the defendant himself.180 Disclosure of 
the defendant’s own speech would almost certainly not threaten 
national security, since the communications were not classified when 
made, and had they been recorded by the defendant rather than the 
government, the defendant could introduce them at trial and reveal 
them to the public at his pleasure.181 When vital national-security 
information is implicated, or when defendants are particularly likely 
to disclose classified information, a strong governmental interest in 
protecting national security—often present in first-generation CIPA 
cases—may justify CIPA’s potential discovery imbalance. 
 
 176. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). 
 177. See 2011 Terrorist Trial Report Card, supra note 117 (percentage calculated using 
underlying data). Of the roughly 1078 terrorism prosecutions in the decade after 9/11, nearly 
five hundred involved individuals without a link to jihadist crimes, but instead other activity 
“such as violence by far right wing paramilitary terror groups in South America or the United 
States.” Id. at 7 n.2. A further 231 defendants classified as jihadists had no identifiable link to a 
terrorist organization. Id. at 14.  
 178. See id. at 14 (percentage calculated from underlying data). 
 179. See id. at 16 (“The idea that terror organization affiliation is on the rise is buttressed, 
for example, by the increase in material support charges, in which 85% are conclusively 
associated with a terrorist group.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, 2339B (2012) (defining the 
offenses of providing material support to terrorism and to designated foreign terrorist 
organizations). 
 180. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.  
 181. Dratel, supra note 132, at 180. 
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2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.  The contextual shift in 
CIPA cases has also threatened defendants’ right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. When evidence has been generated through 
FISA surveillance, discovery will be particularly voluminous. The 
classified evidence will often consist of months of electronic 
surveillance data, including telephone conversations, emails, social-
media or fax exchanges, and Internet browsing histories. One case 
even involved seven years of FISA intercepts.182 
A larger problem is that the content of these intercepts is quite 
often (if not usually) in a foreign language, such as Urdu or Arabic.183 
In United States v. Al-Hussayen,184 for example, the classified 
discovery included more than twenty thousand communications, 
including an additional seventy-five CDs of “classified raw internet 
data” and ninety-seven CDs of classified telephone intercepts, 
“predominantly if not exclusively in Arabic.”185 Defense counsel did 
not speak Arabic, and there were no qualified Arabic translators with 
security clearance in Southern Idaho.186 The volume and language of 
the classified evidence rendered it “impossible for the defense to 
review the materials in time to make effective use of them at trial.”187 
Al-Hussayen thus argued that the government had “used its 
unreviewable classification authority as an offensive weapon, 
effectively placing critical voluminous evidence off-limits to [his] 
defense.”188 This tactic, he claimed, amplified “the general inequity 
created by CIPA in cases in which the defendant does not have 
knowledge of the classified information.”189 
Even beyond these problems, there are scenarios in which the 
defendant’s assistance is essential. In the Embassy Bombings case, 
defendant El-Hage’s attorneys argued that certain classified material 
“must be discussed with Mr. El-Hage prior to his testimony if his right 
 
 182. United States v. Sattar, No. 02 CR. 395 (JGK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164, at *27 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2003). 
 183. See Dratel, supra note 132, at 175–77 (compiling cases). 
 184. United States v. Al-Hussayen, No. CR03-048-C-EJL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29793 (D. 
Idaho Apr. 7, 2004). 
 185. Memorandum in Support of Motion To Declare CIPA Unconstitutional as Applied in 
This Case at 3–4, Al-Hussayen, No. CR03-048-C-EJL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29793. 
 186. Id. at 4.  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 7. 
 189. Id. 
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to counsel . . . is to have any meaning.”190 Counsel further contended 
that because they did not know which government witnesses would 
testify at trial, El-Hage’s assistance was needed to determine what 
portions of the classified discovery materials were relevant to his 
defense.191 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires more than the 
presence of an attorney “alongside the accused”—it also 
comprehends the “effective assistance of counsel.”192 This guarantee is 
violated by a government action that “interferes in certain ways with 
the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to 
conduct the defense.”193 If, as in the case of Al-Hussayen, CIPA is 
used to prevent the defendant from viewing classified information 
relevant to his defense, or to tactically delay declassification until it is 
impossible to effectively review the evidence in time, the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee is interfered with.194 This problem will 
plague nearly every CIPA and FISA case in which the outsider 
defendant does not possess the classified information from the start. 
This issue exists even in the absence of prosecutorial abuse, as the 
sheer volume of classified evidence and the effort required to 
translate it can pose nearly insurmountable tactical obstacles to the 
defense. 
In insider cases, CIPA is rightly invoked to prevent national-
security gamesmanship by the defendant. But in outsider cases, CIPA 
can completely undermine defense counsel’s ability to identify 
exculpatory evidence and enlist the client in his own defense. This 
problem, and many others posed by CIPA, can be readily solved by 
tailoring the statute’s procedural mechanisms to the specific offenses 
that are charged. 
 
 190. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted).  
 191. Id. at 123–24. 
 192. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984) (quotations omitted).  
 193. Id. at 686. 
 194. In contrast to ordinary ineffective-assistance claims, in which a convicted defendant 
identifies something his counsel could have done better with the available information, 
defendants in CIPA cases are instead challenging a systematic “state interference with the 
ability of counsel to render effective assistance to the accused” proscribed by Strickland. Id. at 
683. 
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IV.  A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: AN OFFENSE-SPECIFIC APPROACH 
Without CIPA, the government would be left without any 
procedural mechanism to control the dissemination of national-
security information in criminal proceedings. For this reason, CIPA 
serves a vital function in many cases. Correcting constitutional defects 
in the statute should therefore be accomplished through amendment, 
not repeal. Because it is specifically the contextual shift from insider 
to outsider cases that has engendered constitutional concerns, this 
Note proposes that CIPA be reworked in an offense-specific manner 
to account for varying governmental interests and differently situated 
criminal defendants. This would allow CIPA to remain substantially 
unchanged in its initially contemplated contexts, which have been 
universally upheld. A new set of procedures should be fashioned for 
cases in which the specter of graymail is absent. The ensuing Sections 
suggest new sample language intended to correct contextual 
disparities in enforcement, while preserving the statute’s recognized 
virtues. 
My proposed revision to CIPA would codify the contextual 
variations in CIPA’s use, and, more specifically, would prescribe new 
standards for discoverability, a limited and qualified declassification 
requirement, and a bifurcated method of conducting admissibility 
hearings. 
A. Codifying the Insider–Outsider Distinction 
I propose a statutory recognition of the insider–outsider 
distinction,195 allowing CIPA to adapt dynamically to varying contexts. 
First, Section 1 of the statute should be amended as “Definitions and 
Procedural Application,” with the following new subsection: 
In cases in which the indictment alleges violation(s) of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 792–98, §§ 951–52, § 957, §§ 1385–86, §§ 2381–84,196 or in the 
 
 195. These terms were initially coined by Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky when she observed 
that terrorism cases may exacerbate problems with secret evidence in the courts. Yaroshefsky, 
supra note 4, at 1067–68. Because her article focused on the deleterious effects of secret 
evidence generally, she did not expound on the change in context or suggest how it might be 
resolved. See id. (describing the nature of the distinction). 
 196. Owing to the author’s limited foresight, this is not, and is not intended to be, an 
exhaustive list, but rather a sample of offenses for which there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the defendant will possess sensitive national-security information, thereby triggering a strong 
state interest justifying more restrictive measures. Any statutory amendment should thus 
include any other offenses that meet this criterion. The sample offenses listed here are the 
federal statutes proscribing espionage, aiding a foreign government, selling state secrets, acting 
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prosecution of any government official or member of the armed 
forces for actions committed in their official capacity, §§ 4–6 of this 
Act shall govern the disclosure of classified information. The United 
States may, in the alternative, invoke §§ 4–6 of this Act by 
submitting to the court an affidavit of the Attorney General 
certifying that the defendant is in possession of classified 
information, the disclosure of which would cause identifiable 
damage to the national security of the United States. 
In all cases in which the procedures of Sections 4–6 are not 
invoked pursuant to the above provision, newly added sections of 
CIPA should govern the disclosure of classified information. The 
proposed Section 1 applies CIPA’s existing procedures to 
prosecutions involving espionage, treason, and other typically 
“insider” cases. To alleviate the constitutional concerns arising from 
CIPA’s contextual shift to “outsider” prosecutions, a variety of 
adjustments must be made to the Section 4–6 equivalents for those 
cases.197 
B. Discovery of Classified Information by Defendants 
Section 4 of CIPA currently permits courts to authorize the 
United States to delete or substitute specific pieces of classified 
information from the discovery provided to the defendant through an 
ex parte request by the government.198 The court will determine 
whether documents are discoverable on the basis of their materiality 
and relevance to the defense.199 If documents are deemed to be 
discoverable, then the court can either order disclosure or permit a 
substitution.200 
Forbidding defense counsel from participating in determinations 
of materiality and relevance is indefensible in an adversarial criminal-
justice system—no one but defense counsel, who has conferred with 
her client and developed a legal strategy, could possibly know what is 
 
as an agent of a foreign government without permission, publishing diplomatic codes, possessing 
property in aid of a foreign government, using the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus, 
stealing Department of Defense locks or keys, and committing treason, misprision of treason, 
rebellion or insurrection, or seditious conspiracy.  
 197. These cases will likely predominantly consist of terrorism and international drug-
conspiracy prosecutions. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 4, at 1067–68.  
 198. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 4 (2012).  
 199. See, e.g., United States v. Clegg, 740 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1984) (ordering the 
government to disclose information where materials were “relevant to the development of a 
possible defense”). 
 200. Yaroshefsky, supra note 4, at 1069. 
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material and relevant to the defense. The judge and prosecutor are 
not zealous advocates of the defendant. Surely, then, they should not 
be asked to predict the defense’s theory of the case and fairly 
represent the defendant’s interests. As one court observed, such a 
system “force[s] this court into the very awkward position of making 
[the] defendant’s case and then deciding his claim.”201 The Supreme 
Court has similarly remarked that “[i]n our adversary system, it is 
enough for judges to judge. The determination of what may be useful 
to the defense can properly and effectively be made only by an 
advocate.”202Accordingly, Section 4 should be rewritten as follows 
(with proposed additions marked in italics): 
The court, upon a sufficient showing of irrelevance and 
immateriality, may authorize the United States to delete specified 
items of classified information from documents to be made available 
to the defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, or upon a sufficient showing of identifiable 
damage to the national security of the United States, to substitute a 
summary of the information for such classified documents, or to 
substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified 
information would tend to prove, when such substitution would not 
be reasonably likely to prejudice the defendant. The court may permit 
the United States to make a request for such authorization in the 
form of a written statement to be inspected by the court and by 
defense counsel possessing security clearance at a sufficient level to 
view the classified information at issue. If the court grants such 
authorization, it shall, upon motion of the United States, order 
defense counsel to protect against disclosure of undiscoverable 
classified information to the defendant or any other individual.  
My proposed Section 4 introduces three significant changes. 
First, it alters the ex parte nature of Section 4 hearings, allowing 
cleared defense counsel to object to the government’s requests for 
substitutions and deletions, and thereby argue for the discoverability 
of evidence. Second, it establishes two discrete standards for making 
Section 4 determinations: irrelevance and immateriality (for 
deletions) and identifiable damage to the national security of the 
United States (for substitutions). These new standards would provide 
much-needed clarity for judges deciding whether to admit classified 
 
 201. United States v. Rezaq, 156 F.R.D. 514, 527 (D.D.C. 1994), opinion vacated in part on 
reconsideration, 899 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 202. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966). 
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evidence, and bring the statute more in line with the Roviaro Court’s 
instruction that the executive privilege must be subordinated to the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.203 Clarifying that deletion of evidence 
is permissible only when it bears no relevance to the case should also 
prevent courts from deferring too strongly to the government and 
imposing heightened materiality standards without statutory 
authorization to do so.204 
Finally, this proposal would allow the court to issue a protective 
order barring defense counsel from disclosing to the defendant any 
classified information that the court excludes as a result of its Section 
4 determination. This safeguard would preclude artful defense 
attorneys from using the Section 4 hearing to pinpoint sensitive 
information without having to navigate voluminous recordings, in 
order to facilitate graymail. 
Because the problem of defense counsel’s exclusion from Section 
4 hearings is not intrinsic to outsider cases (though it is certainly more 
pervasive in that context), these changes must be made to both the 
insider and outsider sections of an offense-based CIPA. 
C. The Section 5 Notice and FISA: A Qualified Declassification 
Requirement 
Section 5 of CIPA sets forth the notice requirements of the 
statute.205 Subsection (a) mandates that defendants must provide the 
government with advance notice of any classified information that the 
defense “reasonably expects to disclose or to cause the disclosure 
of . . . in any manner in connection with [the] trial.”206 The defendant 
is also barred from disclosing any classified information until the 
statutorily required notice has been given and the United States has 
been allowed a reasonable time to seek a determination on 
admissibility and appeal any such determination.207 These 
requirements may well impose nonreciprocal (and therefore 
unconstitutional) discovery burdens.208 I propose that Section 5(a) be 
supplemented by the following new language: 
 
 203. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1957) (“Of course where enforcement 
of a nondisclosure policy deprives an accused of a fair trial it must either be relaxed or the 
prosecution must be foregone.”).  
 204. See supra notes 37, 47 and accompanying text. 
 205. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 5 (2012); see supra Part II.A.  
 206. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 5(a). 
 207. Id.  
 208. See supra Part III.B.1.  
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(a)(1) Before the filing of notice by the defendant pursuant to 
Section 5, the Government shall declassify all qualifying classified 
documents or materials. For purposes of this section, a qualifying 
document is one that meets all three of the following criteria: 
(A) The information is limited to the personal communications 
of the defendant, including his or her own telephone, Internet, 
and written communications, or other electronic or Internet 
records, telephone or cellular-device records, or physical 
materials belonging to the defendant, notwithstanding seizure 
by the Government; 
(B) The contents of such documents or communications are not 
classified independent of their presence within a government 
intercept or seizure conducted pursuant to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), or other statute 
authorizing classification based on method of acquisition; AND 
(C) The classified information was made available to the 
defendant by the United States through discovery under the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
These amendments would resolve a recurring problem in 
terrorism prosecutions, in which defendants are prevented from 
disclosing their own emails, conversations, or Google searches, 
merely because of the method through which the government 
acquired them.209 Taken together, these amendments would alleviate 
the Section 5 notice burden by requiring the government to declassify 
the defendant’s personal communications if they were deemed 
discoverable and do not contain content that was classified when the 
defendant uttered or produced it. In other words, the amendments 
mandate declassification of information that was classified solely 
because of method of acquisition, not content. 
This provision would remedy many of Section 5’s constitutional 
problems without impairing any compelling governmental interests. If 
a document is discoverable, it is not excludable anyway, so 
declassification merely eases the review process for counsel by 
eliminating the need to travel to a SCIF to view any FISA-intercepted 
communications, and entirely refrain from discussing them outside 
that area.210 Moreover, since the classification authority rests with the 
government, the only documents that would be declassified would be 
 
 209. See supra Part III.A.  
 210. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; Part II.A.  
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ones that the United States, in its unfettered discretion, does not 
deem classifiable but for the method through which they were 
acquired. Thus, the amendments would not threaten to expose state 
secrets. 
Because classification is an executive function, this proposal 
could not be enforced by a court ordering the government to 
declassify. Instead, failure to declassify would be met with sanctions 
(dismissal of a charge, or other sanctions the district court deems 
appropriate). Sanctions are already imposed under CIPA when the 
government declines to turn over documents deemed discoverable,211 
and could work equally well in this context. The revised Section 5(a) 
should be added only to the new outsider sections because in insider 
prosecutions involving espionage, intelligence officers, or government 
officials, a defendant’s own communications may very well contain 
classified information, and so a content review of all communications 
would be prohibitively onerous for the prosecution and only 
minimally advantageous for the defendant.212 
Prosecutors are likely to object to this proposal because it 
requires the state to undertake a time-consuming pretrial process of 
declassification before discovery. This is a valid concern, but 
prosecutors would be far less burdened by the proposal than defense 
counsel would be in having to travel to a SCIF and navigate 
thousands of hours of recordings to find relevant evidence. This is 
because the state will likely know beforehand whether discovery 
materials contain sensitive information. Prosecutors would also likely 
argue that even the defendant’s innocuous personal communications 
ought to remain classified if disclosure would reveal American 
surveillance protocols. This argument justifies the classification of 
FISA warrants generally, but becomes less persuasive once the 
government has already disclosed to the defendant that he has been 
electronically surveilled under the authority of FISA. 
 
 211. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(e) (2012); see also United States v. Wilson, 586 F. Supp. 1011, 
1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that CIPA “does not alter the existing standards for determining 
relevance or admissibility”). 
 212. For instance, if FISA surveillance had been conducted on an individual charged under 
18 U.S.C. § 798 with transmitting classified documents to a foreign government, the defendant’s 
intercepted electronic documents would presumably contain the very classified information that 
gave rise to the charge. In contrast, the personal communications of terrorism defendants rarely, 
if ever, contain information that would be classified because of its content; instead, they usually 
contain incriminatory statements or Internet searches evincing a desire to commit or conspire to 
commit an act of terror. This would make it much easier for the government to identify 
communications classifiable on the basis of content, if they even existed at all.  
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D. The Section 6 Hearing and Bifurcation 
Section 6 allows the government to move for a hearing on the 
use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information contained in 
the defendant’s Section 5 notice.213 As many defendants have argued, 
this effectively requires the defense to hand the government a 
roadmap of its case by explaining counsel’s theories on the use and 
relevance of defense evidence. Further, Section 6 imposes greater 
discovery burdens on defendants than on the government.214 Whereas 
compelling state interests justify these lopsided procedures for insider 
CIPA cases, no such justification exists in the vast majority of 
terrorism prosecutions. Thus, Section 6(a) should be rewritten as 
follows to account for outsider cases (proposed changes are marked 
in italics): 
Within the time specified by the court for the filing of a motion 
under this section, and upon request of the United States, the court 
shall conduct a series of hearings to make all determinations 
concerning the use, relevance, or admissibility of classified 
information that would otherwise be made during the trial or 
pretrial proceeding. Before making its determination of admissibility, 
the court shall order defense counsel to make an in camera and ex 
parte showing of the use, admissibility, and relevance of such 
information. The court shall then conduct an in camera review of the 
United States’ reasons counseling against disclosure. As to each item 
of classified information, the court shall set forth in writing the basis 
for its determination. 
The sample language above also omits the provision of Section 
6(a) that currently allows for an in camera hearing upon certification 
by the Attorney General that “a public proceeding may result in the 
disclosure of classified information.”215 This provision is obviated by 
the proposed amendment’s requirement that all proceedings be held 
in camera. The most significant proposed change is the bifurcation of 
the hearing stage. Counsel for the United States would be excluded 
from the initial hearing, and as such, would not be privy to defense 
counsel’s theories on the use and relevance of classified information 
(though the United States would be allowed to make a separate in 
camera showing of the state interests weighing against disclosure). 
 
 213. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6.  
 214. See supra Part III.B.1.  
 215. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 6(a).  
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Excluding the United States from such hearings is not 
unprecedented.216 In United States v. Bin Laden, the court rejected the 
government’s argument that an ex parte showing by the defendant 
would “clearly frustrate CIPA’s purpose in identifying for the 
Government the national security ‘cost’ of going forward with 
particular charges against particular defendants.”217 The district court, 
acknowledging that CIPA’s framers “expected the trial judge to 
fashion creative and fair solutions for classified information 
problems,”218 held five in camera CIPA hearings.219 First, defendant 
El-Hage’s attorneys, in the presence of the government, described the 
classified information expected to be disclosed. The court then 
excused defense counsel in order to hear the government’s reasons 
for refusing to declassify. Finally, the court recalled El-Hage’s 
attorneys, “inquiring, in the absence of government counsel, into the 
use that El-Hage’s counsel planned to make of the classified 
information at issue.”220 This solution, which succeeded in preventing 
prejudice to either side in Bin Laden, should be statutorily mandated 
in CIPA. 
Excluding the government’s attorneys from a hearing on the use 
and relevance of evidence to the defense case is not as problematic as 
excluding defense counsel from a Section 4 hearing. In the latter 
situation, the court makes a determination on the relevance and 
materiality of evidence for the defense, but with no input from 
defense counsel. This is particularly troubling because only defense 
counsel could possibly know the defense’s theory of the case, and 
thus, the relevance and materiality of evidence. In a Section 6 
hearing, however, exclusion of the United States would not prejudice 
 
 216. See United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 29 (D.D.C. 1989) (permitting an ex 
parte submission so that defendant would not have to disclose his trial strategy to the 
government). In United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1983), the district court 
allowed an ex parte and in camera hearing on discovery for Oliver North. Id. at 391. “[T]he 
court heard North and his counsel at an ex parte, in camera hearing where aspects of North’s 
defense were revealed. As a result of that proceeding, without giving Independent Counsel even 
an opportunity to be heard, the Court ordered extensive discovery on July 8, 1988.” Id. Though 
this was not a hearing on materiality, the court’s in camera review of defense counsel’s reasons 
for pursuing pieces of evidence is analogous to a materiality showing, in which counsel would 
have to disclose his theory of relevance and use.  
 217. United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023 LBS, 2001 WL 66393, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 25, 2001). 
 218. Id. (quoting United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D.D.C. 1989)).  
 219. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 118–19 (2d Cir. 
2008).  
 220. Id. at 119.  
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either side, as the presence of the government’s attorney is not 
necessary to determine the materiality of evidence to the defense. 
Under a bifurcated system, the government would still be given the 
Section 5 notice of classified information that the defendant intends 
to disclose, but would not know how defense counsel intended to use 
it. 
Of course, if Section 5 of CIPA is amended as suggested in the 
previous section, Section 6 hearings will become somewhat rare in 
outsider cases, since personal communications will have been 
declassified. As a result, these hearings will only be necessary when 
the evidence at issue does not concern personal communications, such 
as Zacarias Moussaoui’s request to depose detainees. For the same 
reasons as with the Section 5 amendments, these changes must be 
only in the new sections dealing with outsider cases. Because the 
content of the classified information in insider cases is far more likely 
to be sensitive, the threat of exposing the government to “surprise at 
what may be revealed in the defense”221 is much greater in 
prosecutions of government officials and intelligence officers. As 
previously discussed, the argument against forcing defense counsel to 
make extensive disclosures is based on the qualified222 rights to 
pretrial silence and reciprocal discovery burdens. These are overcome 
in insider cases, where the strong interest against inadvertent 
disclosure of vital state secrets outweighs the defendant’s right to 
reciprocal burdens. 
CONCLUSION 
More than half a century ago, the Supreme Court declared that 
when disclosure of classified information is necessary for a fair trial of 
the accused, “the [executive] privilege must give way.”223 The Court 
declined to establish clear rules for courts to use in this difficult 
interest-balancing equation. As originally conceived, CIPA served a 
vital gap-filling function by establishing fixed procedures for the 
admission of classified information in criminal trials. But a recent 
contextual shift in the types of cases involving CIPA has resulted in 
increasing deference to the Executive at the expense of the “fair 
 
 221. United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1200 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 222. See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973) (stating that the right to 
reciprocal discovery burdens exists only “in the absence of a strong showing of state interests to 
the contrary”).  
 223. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61 (1957).  
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determination of a cause.”224 As a result, CIPA—an otherwise facially 
constitutional statute—has become unconstitutional as applied in 
many cases. As the Rovario Court remarked, “Whether a proper 
balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the 
particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the 
crime charged, the possible defenses, . . . and other relevant factors.”225 
As currently written, CIPA applies identically to all circumstances 
and federal crimes. 
By amending CIPA in an offense-specific manner and tailoring 
CIPA’s procedures to the criminal defendant in question, the statute’s 
important goal of providing a sensible interest-balancing mechanism 
can be preserved. A dynamic and adaptable CIPA would also bring 
the statute in line with the Court’s instructions on offense-tailored 
interest balancing. To these ends, this Note has proposed sample 
amendments designed to achieve an offense-based CIPA, including 
(1) a more inclusive discovery process and clearer standards to govern 
discoverability; (2) a limited and qualified declassification system in 
select cases involving FISA; and (3) a new bifurcated procedure for 
Section 6 hearings on admissibility. 
In an era of unprecedented government secrecy, it is more 
important than ever to preserve the integrity of our courts. CIPA was 
designed for this very purpose, but if it is not brought into the twenty-
first century, it will undermine that integrity and subvert the 
procedural safeguards that have long been hallmarks of our 
Constitution. 
 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 62 (emphasis added). 
